CybAfriqué is a space for news and analysis on cyber, data, and information security on the African continent.
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This week, we bring you the continuous Starlink License War in South Africa, everything we know so far and the disturbing issue of Military Disinformation going on in Côte d’Ivoire.
HIGHLIGHTS
Starlink v. SA is the ultimate policy showdown
Starlink has an Africa problem. The satellite-powered internet provider has faced regulatory problems across the continent, including regulatory standoffs in Nigeria, licensing problems in country like Namibia, Zimbabwe, and DRC Congo, and outright bans in at least two countries, Botswana and Cameroon. All of this, however, are still minor to what front Elon Musk’s internet service company has had to put up with in South Africa.
Earlier this week, South Africa’s regulator began seizing Starlink equipment as Starlink also effectively shut down its service in the country, which, for the past two years, has been accessible to users via an international roaming option. This came after a promising review of South Africa’s socio ethnic ownership and equality regulations that would have meant Starlink would finally have true regulatory licensing to operate in the country.
What’s the problem? Starlink is hindered by regulations in South Africa that require companies to be partially owned by minority group in order to operate in the country. This law, which was set up in the wake of apartheid, ensures socio ethnic distribution of wealth.
ICYMI: Starlink’s Regulatory Struggles
In the earliest iteration of Starlink’s agenda, South Africa was meant to be a done market by early 2024. They made an announcement in 2023 specifically stating South Africa as part of its Africa frontier program, promising accessible internet to “Africa’s underserved areas.” Anyone launching anything in Africa would practically need South Africa. It is a country with a technological leader in Africa, boasting a thriving tech sector and strong infrastructure and it's often considered a key tech hub, particularly for smart city technology and IT services.. It also houses many of Africa’s largest tech businesses, such as Naspers, a global internet and e-commerce company, and Takealot, a leading South African e-commerce platform. All this keeps businesses open, regardless of whether Starlink’s written mission to serve underserved areas in Africa with accessible internet is true or not. South Africa is up there on the list of countries likely to buy the most units of Starlink equipment with a one time payment of €349 internet kit on a continent where most ISPs cost less than $20 to set up.
Starlink’s first hitch in South Africa came in 2024, when Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (Icasa) - a regulatory body in the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors told the BBC that Starlink had never submitted any application for a licence. Since then, Elon has made comments saying Starlink did not receive licensing in South Africa because he’s black, which authorities debunked saying they did not receive any licensing application from Starlink; Starlink and South Africa have entered into talks, which at some point Starlink pulled out of after Elon Musk shared false claims about white genocide in South Africa.
All of this has also not happened in a wider political vacuum. ICASA’s abrupt turn on Starlink, for example, came after President Ramphosa was ambushed by President Trump during his attempt at correcting claims of genocide made by Trump and Elon. Trump’s administration, through its international relations, has actively imposed Starlink on African countries as a condition for diplomatic conditions, as reported by ProPublica.
Coup in a coop
Ongoing disinformation campaigns in West Africa remain a major concern, as new and insidious forms continue to emerge. For example, a disinformation campaign recently occurred in Côte d'Ivoire, as reported by folks at DAIDAC. Just a few weeks ago, social media posts began circulating, one of which falsely claimed a coup was underway in the country, supported by numerous videos and images.
On Tuesday, May 20, a user named Mehmet Vefa Dağ posted a video on TikTok with the caption, "Coup is happening in Ivory Coast and next on the list are Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe." This video exemplified the type of disinformation being spread. It was identified as one of the first online posts promoting the false coup, initially garnering 445 views on TikTok. Around 12:14 PM on May 20, Dağ posted the same video to his X (formerly Twitter) account, where it gained significant attention, receiving over 312,600 views. More than 20 other users subsequently shared the video across various platforms, increasing its total views by thousands.
Many individuals promoted this false information, notably Mehmet Vefa Dağ, a popular social media user known for advocating authoritarian rule, such as that of the junta leaders in Francophone countries like Mali and Burkina Faso. Between May 20 and 22, Mehmet shared over 110 posts on X, including reposts from other accounts and original videos, and 39 pieces of content on his TikTok account. In these posts, he praised military leaders in the Sahel region and promoted coups in other African countries, falsely claiming a coup had occurred in Côte d’Ivoire.
A reverse image search of keyframes from the video, conducted by the fact-checking organization Dubawa, revealed that the footage was initially posted in April 2011 and depicted the arrest of former Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo, not Alassane Ouattara.
ICYMI: Solving Disinformation in Africa
Social media continues to be a potent tool for spreading disinformation and promoting military rule in Africa. Similar attempts have been seen in the past, such as in Nigeria, where the prominent display of Russian flags strongly suggested interference from Russia, a country known for its authoritarian stance and friendly relations with nations that have successfully carried out coups and are currently under military control.
The campaign highlights the established patterns of Foreign Interference and Manipulation of Information (FIMI) disinformation campaigns.
FEATURES
This policy brief is about the critical, yet often overlooked, intersection of disinformation and violent extremism, particularly focusing on Boko Haram in Nigeria. It explains how violent extremist groups intentionally spread false or misleading information to propagate hateful narratives, incite violence, and recruit new members. The brief outlines the conditions that enable such disinformation, its defining characteristics, and its potential negative impacts, concluding with evidence-based recommendations for policymakers and practitioners to better assess, prevent, and mitigate its adverse effects.
This article highlights the increasing prevalence of cyberattacks across the Maghreb and Sahara regions, a direct consequence of growing digitalization. It details various cyber threats, including malware, ransomware, DDoS attacks, and phishing, which are targeting state institutions, private and public companies, and individuals, posing a significant challenge to businesses and governments. The piece underscores the vital role of regional cooperation, with governments actively collaborating through joint exercises, information sharing, and resource pooling, often facilitated by organizations like ECOWAS and the Arab Maghreb Union, to bolster cyber defenses against these evolving threats.
HEADLINES
546 Million South African Cookies Found on Dark Web, Reveals NordVPN
Somalia strengthens its cybersecurity with a strategic partnership signed with Malaysia
Achievement of Burkina Faso’s Captain Ibrahim Traore: Facts vs Myths
After service suspension, Starlink faces a high-stakes push for a South African licence
Bizarre as Nigerian youths are forced into internet fraud in Ghana
ACROSS THE WORLD
China-linked hackers exploit Google Calendar in cyberattacks on governments
Malaysian home minister’s WhatsApp hacked, used to scam contacts